NDTV Hindu Program on Two and a Half Books

NDTV Hindu did a feature on 'Two and Half Books' in Chennai. 'Two and a Half Books' was a joint event on my book i.e The Upside Down Book of Nuclear Power, my wife Devapriya's book The Vague Woman's Handbook and our forthcoming title The Heat and Dust Project which is still in process.

GTRE's Laghu Shakti Engine

Well, here's a cross-sectional rendering of GTRE's Laghu Shakti Engine which is primarily being developed for use in UAVs and such like. It's apparently in the 400 Kgf thrust class.

Indian JSOW?

Well, Whaddya know? Looks like India has an answer to the JSOW :) . Displayed here is Gurgaon based Basant Aerospace's SWAK or "Smart Wing Adapter Kit for general purpose bombs". The image below gives you some specs ( make that very scant specs).

Let's see if anything comes of this.

Here's a summary of what I learnt from my recent trip to Kaiga.

The Department of Atomic Energy or DAE’s CIRUS research reactor is due to be phased out this year. However, according to Srikumar Banerjee, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Secretary, DAE, a replacement is on the anvil, although it will take a few years to come online. Speaking at the recently held Kaiga-4 criticality celebrations, Banerjee added that radio-isotope production though is not expected to suffer.

CIRUS, a 40 megawatt (MW) research reactor supplied by Canada in the fifties and loaded with US origin heavy water, was the source of the plutonium used in India’s first nuclear test at Pokharan in 1974 and the subject of much controversy between India, Canada and the United States. Over the years, besides aiding India’s strategic programmes, CIRUS has also become a major source for important medical isotopes. Nevertheless, it is due to be phased out this year under the terms of the Indo–US 123 agreement signed in 2008.

The phasing out of CIRUS however is not expected to adversely affect isotope availability in the country as remedial steps are already underway. These steps include a refurbishment of the 100 MW Dhruva reactor which was concluded recently and an up-rating of the Apsara reactor from 1 to 2 MW. Moreover, the Apsara reactor will no longer use imported fuel and will only be laden with domestically fabricated fuel in the future.

The AEC chairman also highlighted the increasing prospects for Cobalt-60 (an important isotope for agricultural and medical applications) production in country. DAE is making use of 12 existing Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) by loading Cobalt-59 as a central rod in them and getting Cobalt-60 as a by-product; indeed, this may lead to India becoming one of the largest producers of Cobalt-60 in the world.

The replacement for CIRUS is being billed as a multi-purpose research reactor (MPRR) and is slated to come up in the new BARC campus at Vishakapatnam. The focus is stated to be on radio-isotope production and material testing. However, when asked whether this reactor will also be coupled with an accelerator-driven system (ADS) in the future, Banerjee replied, “There has been a re-think on this and it is, as of now, not being considered”.

ADSs are an important part of DAE’s strategy for completing the third stage of India’s nuclear programme which aims to utilize the country’s abundant thorium reserves. However, Banerjee believes that research on the third stage was “progressing smoothly” through other DAE reactors and facilities, and therefore it was decided that the MPRR be tailored to meet more urgent requirements such as materials testing and isotope production. He added that this was precisely why that the MPRR is being designed with an emphasis on high neutron flux as opposed to capacity rating.

In the future, the cornerstone of thorium research in the country will be the 300 MWe Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) on which construction activity is expected to begin soon, even though a site has not been finalized yet. Realistically though, large scale thorium deployment is still “25–30 years away”, according to Banerjee.

Meanwhile, the first stage of DAE’s programme seems to be undergoing some re-orientation as well, primarily owing to India’s new-found access to foreign uranium coupled with breakthroughs in enrichment technology. DAE is confident of launching an indigenous Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) design by 2020 in addition to the imported PWRs and domestic PHWRs which are being set up in the country. This newfound focus on indigenous PWR technology is now being considered an important part of DAE’s aim to attain 62,000 MW installed capacity in the country by 2032.

Grandfather treaties come in rather handy in the world of international politics, sometimes even way past their sell by dates. Of course the sell by date has just been revised in the latest round of Sino-Pak tango at Chashma. Moreover, as I argue in this article over at WPR, this could just be a signal that China is entering the small reactor ( less than or equal to 300 MWe) market in right earnest ..

The Upside Down Book Of Nuclear Power

Alright People,


My book- The Upside Down Book Of Nuclear Power (HarperCollins 2010) is now available at most major stores across India.

Here's the blurb-

"Arcane discussions on nuclear power have been confounding people for a long time. The Upside Down Book of Nuclear Power is an attempt to demystify this critical area of public choice for the general reader. While it does not forego the seriousness associated with the topic, the book provides for an easy read that informs the reader of a variety of issues associated with the subject. Divided into short chapters, aspects such as technology, resource availability, economics, geopolitics and policies associated with nuclear power are dealt with in detail, but in a way that emphasizes readability. Contentious areas such as safety, waste management and the latest trends associated with them are laid bare for the reader. The book also dwells in depth on the shrill and seldom above-board debate on nuclear power and renewables. An invaluable companion for all those looking to understand the nature of the nuclear industry in the new millennium and the implications of international treaties such as the Indo-US nuclear deal. "

The Kaiga Incident (Contamination at Indian Nuclear Plant not a Leak)

Headlines of major Indian newspapers that screamed about a nuclear leak at the Kaiga nuclear power plant in the Indian state of Karnataka on Nov. 24 have been misleading as to the nature of the incident.

The published stories read as though heavy water or deuterium oxide used as a moderator and coolant in the Kaiga-1 nuclear reactor had somehow leaked and mixed with drinking water at the plant, leading to some 50 employees being hit by radiation sickness. To set the record straight, the number of employees that fell sick was right – but there was no "leak" or radioactive release at Kaiga.

Contrary to what the initial stories seemed to suggest, heavy water used in pressurized heavy water reactors like Kaiga-1 simply cannot “mix” with the drinking water supply at a nuclear power plant. There is no physical connectivity between the plumbing of the drinking water supply and the moderator tubes or coolant channels containing the heavy water.

What did happen, as confirmed by Indian authorities, was that a disgruntled employee poured tritiated heavy water into one of the water coolers outside the reactor building. All personnel who were found to be contaminated during routine urine tests had drunk water from this particular cooler.

As an independent journalist who has been taken on tours of some of India’s nuclear power stations, this writer can tell you that there are no coolers in the reactor building of a nuclear plant, nor for that matter are any eatables allowed there.

However, coolers are present in the service building, which is distinct from the reactor building and houses apparel-changing areas and restrooms. It was a cooler in the service building that was found to have been contaminated by someone who had poured tritiated water into the cooler through its overflow pipe, since the lid of the cooler itself was screwed shut.

The source of the radioactive heavy water was a tritium vial, which is normally used to carry heavy water samples from various parts of the reactor for routine chemical analysis. Some of these chemical analysis stations are located in the service building area. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, which is generated in heavy water during reactor operations. It is typically used in fusion research and also serves as an ingredient in boosted fission and thermonuclear devices.

India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board stated that all persons working in the plant were checked and anyone found to have ingested tritium was taken to hospital and given diuretics to accelerate the removal of the tritium by urination. After this treatment only two people showed levels of exposure to radiation that marginally exceeded safety levels. The two were to receive further medical treatment.

This is not the first incident of this sort. In 1990 the Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station in New Brunswick, Canada was witness to a similar perfidy. That time as well, a disgruntled employee had poured the contents of tritium sampling vials into a water cooler, leading to several employees falling ill.

The Indian nuclear industry is deeply regarded the world over for maintaining the most stringent safety standards. The World Association of Nuclear Operators has commended the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, which operates the Kaiga plant, on numerous occasions for its safety standards.

In fact, the early detection of tritium contamination shows the high priority accorded to personnel safety by India’s Department of Atomic Energy.

Every Indian nuclear plant has an embedded Health Physics Unit that operates independently of plant authorities and is directly controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy. These units are fundamentalist in their approach to worker safety and are tasked with issuing radiological permits, which contain the clearance as well as work duration, on any given day, for employees scheduled for operations in the reactor building.

There is no concept of “seating” in the reactor level, meaning there is no permanent station for any particular employee. Employees usually enter the reactor level on specific tasks for which clearance is separately granted on each occasion, and the time limit for such tasks is set by the health unit, taking into account ambient levels of radiation to which a worker will be exposed in a particular area of the reactor zone. In exiting the reactor level workers go through radiation scanners and can leave only when cleared by these machines.

Indian nuclear reactors are operated on an eight-hour shift basis, with four shifts of 60 to 70 personnel. One shift is used to facilitate the changeover. When the reactor is in operation, only authorized personnel of a particular shift are allowed into the reactor level, including those who are specifically tasked with collecting heavy water samples.

Contract workers hired for routine jobs like sanitation are typically allowed access only to the service building area and not in the reactor zone when the reactors are in operation. However, during maintenance shutdowns, contract workers may work in the reactor building but only under the supervision of permanent shift employees assigned to the reactor level. This was the case with Kaiga-1, which had been undergoing routine maintenance since October 20, when the recent incident occurred.

Heavy water sample collection is a specific, scheduled activity that cannot be carried out by just anyone. Conspiracy theorists that suggest tritiated heavy water can be found simply lying around a plant to be collected by anybody are indulging in flights of fantasy.

Access to all areas of the power plant, including the reactor building, service building and turbine room, can only be gained through computer-controlled grilles monitored by security personnel and requiring authorized electronic dog tags. All structures in the plant have surveillance cameras that record personnel movements.

Given all this, it is nearly impossible for an outsider to breach security at a nuclear plant. These controls also ensure that no terrorist can steal radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, as some alarmists like to fancy. So, in a sense, the public can breathe easy on that point.

However, as evidenced in the Kaiga incident, all these precautions are not enough to prevent a disgruntled insider from indulging in mischief that can seriously endanger colleagues. This needs to be looked into. While no system can be foolproof to every kind of internal sabotage, some new procedures might be needed to better guard against such acts.

This Article First appeared in UPI Asia.