There is a growing tendency in some quarters to posit renewables particularly wind power, as an alternative to Nuclear power. These suggestions, howsoever well intentioned, are utterly misplaced. Most Renewable means of generation barring a few are essentially intermittent power sources, and are thoroughly unsuitable for base load supply, as it were. Now, as we all know high capacity factors and availability is what makes nuclear power an attractive option for forming the backbone of any grid. Intermittent power sources at best can be peaking schemes and are more suited to off-grid profiles. Comparing wind power to nuclear sources of generation is akin to comparing apples to oranges.


Wind power in particular has huge grid penetration issues and is utterly unsuitable for base load supply. Various studies have shown that at the very best , wind power can be allowed a 20 per cent grid penetration ratio. Many commentators, especially in India, consider wind power an "enemy of the grid". This is on account of the fact, that wind power generation often takes place when you don't need it. For instance wind power generation is relatively higher in the monsoon period; however that is also a time when many hydro power stations come into their own. Now these stations are generally cheaper than wind power and merit order dispatch requires that these stations contribute to the grid first. Thus a need to store the power from wind turbines arises and storage of power is neither cheap nor large scale.

Wind turbine capacity factors even with the latest turbines that generate power while revolving in either direction are no higher than 30 per cent. Hybridisation with other renewable means such as solar PV can mitigate non-availability somewhat ,but not by much. In any case there is no escaping the standard power quality issues that would arise with an intermittent source such as wind. This of course means that wind turbines have disproportionately high reactive power needs and this increases the cost of installation due to the need to have various power quality devices.

Though costs by swept rotor area, especially due to larger capture units have declined, they are still quite high. As they say, most of the low hanging fruit in terms of windy sites has been taken. In any case land is becoming increasingly scarce and large wind farms are becoming increasingly difficult to locate. This is actually one of the main drivers behind the rise of off shore wind power. However, off shore wind power is no panacea either and there are huge power evacuation issues related to the same.Indeed, in the years to come, the prime resource for generation of wind power will not be wind but windy sites.

Wind power is not the solution to our huge grid connected requirements. It is an accessory and when used in consort with other technologies may serve as an excellent standalone option. however to say that it can serve as a viable grid connected alternative to nuclear power is stretching the point a bit too much.

Floating Nuclear Plants, anyone?


There is this somewhat "interesting" article in the Deccan herald , which talks of stuff like "second hand reactors" and the new floating nuclear plants (FNPP) that the Russians are building. I must admit, that at first glance the article seemed a little laughable , however on second thoughts there might be an issue or two there, somewhere.

Now the point is, these new mobile Russian power plants are essentially ships with a reactor integrated into the assembly. The idea itself is nothing new, and the U.S military actually operated a 'nuclear barge', the MH-1A Sturgis in the sixties. However, the article says that such floating nuclear powers may be supplied to India. This immediately raises the question as to how this could be facilitated outside the auspices of the NSG.

Well, to stretch a point , India is being transferred "floating nuclear plants" in the form of the Shchuka-B (NATO: Akula) class attack submarines, albeit on a lease basis. well, can it be that a similar arrangement is arrived at for a "real" FNPP , given that these are essentially ships with a nuclear reactor.?


Imagine a scenario wherein the reactor remains sealed most of the time and under supervision, while "replenishment " is done offshore and closely controlled by the supplier, in this case the Russians. Moreover, NSG guidelines are not really explicit on the issue of ship to shore power . this of course raises an interesting possibility.

Say, for arguments sake , such a reactor is transferred under a "military power supply program" . May be that's doable , but the much more interesting question relates to the supply of fuel. where would the enriched fuel required for these reactors be sourced from?

The larger questions pertaining to the evacuation of power from these plants and safety concerns are another area altogether. maybe some other time...

Uranium from Seawater

Amidst all this talk of 'importing" Uranium , we are forgetting that the largest potential source of Uranium is much nearer to our shores than we generally think. In fact, it is right next to our shoreline. Yes, i am talking about the seas that grace our coasts. Though the concentration of Uranium in sea water is only about 3 mg U/m, this actually translates into a huge uranium reserve (about 4 billion tons). Even if only half of this resource could ultimately be recovered, it could support for 6,500 years 3,000 GW of nuclear capacity (75 percent capacity factor) based on next-generation reactors operated simply in a once-through fuel cycle. Once we take reprocessing into account, even a minuscule fraction of this figure can supply the world's reactors many times over.


Unfortunately, as with most good things, recovery of uranium from seawater has issues as well. For instance it is by no means cheap. The recovery cost has been estimated to be 5-10 times of that from mining uranium on land. More than 80 per cent of the total cost is occupied by the cost for marine equipment for mooring adsorbents in seawater. It is believed that this cost can be reduced to half if a 75 per cent reduction in the weight of equipment is achieved. But then, this isn't that easy, is it? Improvement of adsorbent ability is also a problem for future research since the cost directly depends on the adsorbent performance.

Needless to say, changes in costs or prices may alter economic viability status , appreciably. Research on a process being developed in Japan suggests that it might be feasible to recover uranium from seawater at a cost of $120 per lb of U₃O₈. Now this is about twice the current price, and seawater might just become a potential source of vast amounts of uranium, sooner than we think.


In any case DAE has prioritized research into this area. Indeed, DAE's bi-monthly digest Nuclear India says that " BARC made significant progress in its attempts to bio-recover uranium from seawater ..." . who knows maybe a pleasant surprise is in the offing.

The Indo-U.S nuclear deal does not seem to be going anywhere. Stymied by opposition from the left, the Government seems set to miss its June date with the IAEA to negotiate a set of India-specific safeguards for the so called civilian list. Indeed, efforts are now underway to tap non-Nuclear Supplier Group (non-NSG) countries for natural uranium. Meanwhile, the U.S continues to push for the civilian nuclear deal. Recent comments made by the U.S ambassador suggest that Washington is still quite keen to wrap the Indo-U.S nuclear accord. Of course key officials on the U.S side continue to prod India by citing congressional procedural time frames and the importance of going to the IAEA this June. However, as mentioned above that does not seem to be happening, primarily on account of opposition from the left.

So where does this leave the prospects for nuclear power generation in India? The IAEA’s “red book,” classifies India’s natural uranium holdings as consisting of 54,636 tons of “reasonably assured resources” (RAR); 25,245 tons in estimated additional resources (EAR-Category I [in situ resources]); 15,488 tons in undiscovered conventional resources (EAR-Category II); and, finally, 17,000 tons in speculative resources (SR), for a grand total of 112,369 tons of uranium reserves without any assigned cost ranges. If our attention is restricted to those reserves that are assumed to be recoverable with a high degree of confidence, essentially the RAR and EAR-I categories, then, India’s stock of natural uranium would total 79,881 tons, close to the figure routinely cited in DAE publications. Other international sources, such as the World Energy Council, the World Information Service on Energy (WISE) Uranium Project, and the IAEA’s own surveys of India’s nuclear industry generally agree with this estimate.

The figure mentioned above is sufficient to fuel a fleet of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) with a total capacity of 10,000 MW. However, to look beyond this figure, India needs either international co-operation or the successful completion of India’s three stage programme that envisions the large scale utilization of the country’s significant thorium resources. Unfortunately, the latter continues to be far into the future whereas India’s power requirements are clear and present.

Indian nuclear managers are fully cognizant of the fact, that as their new indigenously built PHWRs come on line, the demand for fuel will only increase, further widening the deficit caused by the constraints in milling capacity (and, to the degree relevant, mining capacity as well).

There are reports that the government feels that it is no longer longer prudent to wait for the deal and the subsequent NSG approval which is concomitant on the former. It has been reported that the government has moved ahead on building bridges with key non-NSG Uranium suppliers including Namibia, Niger and Uzbekistan. Both Namibia and Niger have huge reserves of uranium. In fact, Namibia has around 10 per cent of the world’s uranium reserves and these could be easily tapped by India to fuel its nuclear power programme. According to the reports alluded to above , the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) will soon discuss cooperation between Indian and Namibian utilities for uranium mining and its shipment back to the country. Indeed an MoU which is being finalised between India and Namibia for the mining sector could provide the basic framework for cooperation in uranium as well. As far as Niger is concerned, an Indian company, Taurian Resources was awarded rights for uranium exploration in a few blocks in that country, last year itself. Co-operation between DAE and this company seems likely.

In the midst of all this, it must be kept in mind that the recent fall in PLFs experienced by NPCIL’s existing PHWRs has nothing to do with the level of uranium resources in the country. The current situation is on account of a mismatch between fuel demand and supply, and is not meant to be alleviated through the import of Uranium. It must be understood by readers that fuel for reactors undergoes several stages of processing and fabrication before it is ready to be loaded .Thus even though a new milling unit was commissioned at Turamdih last year , it will take sometime before the benefits of the same kick in. This is on account of the fact that the ore processed from Turamdih will have to go through various stages of fabrication at the Nuclear fuel complex at Hyderabad before it is ready for use and it will be sometime before this new mine and processing unit is fully integrated into the fuel loop, as it were. In any case NPCIL feels that the situation will be remedied in the next 6-8 months.

Uranium imports whether under the auspices of the NSG or not, are meant for future capacity, situated at coastal locations. When the deal seemed likely, these coastal sites were actually identified for locating Pressurized Water reactors (PWRs), each having a minimum capacity of 1000 MWe. To put this in perspective India’s new generation indigenous PHWRs will have a capacity rating of only 700 MWe. Thus the PWR route was being seen as a way to augment base-load capacity quickly and in relatively less space than equivalent coal-fired capacity. A single coastal site could host up to eight PWRs. However, PWRs use low enriched uranium and therefore merely importing natural uranium would not suffice. Indeed, the deal was important because it would have allowed India to source “enriched uranium” from overseas. Now, the fact is, India has no enrichment facility on the civilian list. So either policy makers will have to take a decision to set up new enrichment facilities or these sites will have to be down-rated to serve as hosts for indigenous PHWRs. Clearly some tough choices lay ahead for the Indian nuclear planner.